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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15

USIA-15 IO-13 AID-20 ACDA-19 NIC-01 RSR-01 /171 W
006032 DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/IR

R 181141Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 121
INFO AMEMBASSY Dacca
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
CINCPAC

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CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD 5812

CINRPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN SITUATION AS VIEWED BY
1. I CALLED ON

AND ASKED HIS INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION. HE APPEARED TO WELCOME
OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE HIS VIEWS, AND COMMENCED BY
OBSERVING THAT HIS STATEMENTS WOULD BE PERSONAL

2. HE SAID HE HAS ALWAYS REGARDED THE KING AND
ROYAL FAMILY IN AFGHANISTAN TO CONSTITUTE GUARANTEE
AGAINST SOVIET DOMINATION OF THAT COUNTRY AND OF
MODERATION ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN QUESTION.

3. ON OTHER HAND, HE PORTRAYED PRINCE DAUD AS ONE

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THOROUGHLY INDOCTRINATED BY SOVIETS UNQTE AND AS LEADER WHO WOULD ESSENTIALLY FOLLOW THE SOVIET LINE. FURTHER-
MORE.

4. [] SPECULATED ON POSSIBILITY OF OPPOSITION BUILDING UP TO DAUD'S COUP D'ETAT, OBSERVING THAT SEVERAL TRIBAL AS WELL AS RELIGIOUS LEADERS OWED THEIR LOYALTY TO KING. HOWEVER, SAID HE WAS INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY SUCCESSFUL COUNTER COUP D'ETAT INASMUCH AS OPPOSITION FORCES WOULD LIKELY BE UP AGAINST VERY SUPERIOR ARMOR CONTROLLED BY DAUD AND HIS SUPPORTERS.

5. [] ON TO TERM IRAN AS BEING CAUGHT IN A TIGHTER SOVIET PINCH, SURROUNDED BY IRAQ, INDIA AND NOW AFGHANISTAN -- ALL CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED BY THE SOVIETS.

6. I ASKED [] IF I MIGHT BE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD CHARACTERIZED HIS REMARKS AS

PERSONAL, THESE MIGHT NOT IN FACT BE WIDELY SHARED AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES. HE IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. HE ADDED THAT CHINESE WOULD VERY LIKELY MAKE A SIMILAR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION.

7. COMMENT: I CAREFULLY REFRAINED FROM GIVING ANY INDICATION WHATSOEVER OF SHARING [] VIEWS, AND IN FACT TOOK PAINS TO QUESTION SOME OF THESE WITH DELIBERATE SHOW OF SKEPTICISM. WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT MANY [] OFFICIALS DO INDEED HOLD VIEWS SIMILAR TO THOSE HERE EXPRESSED. IT WOULD BE QUITE CONSISTENT WITH KNOWN [] VIEWS OF OVERALL SOVIET INTENTIONS FOR THEM TO SEE DAUD'S COUP AS ONE ELEMENT IN SOVIET CONSPIRACY RATHER THAN INDIGENOUS AFGHAN POWER PLAY.
SANDERHOFF

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